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Wuhan novel-Coronavirus (2019-nCoV): Why global control is challenging 
On 31 December 2019, the World Health Organisation (WHO) was alerted to the emergence of cases 
of pneumonia of unknown etiology detected in Wuhan City, China. Within days, Chinese health 
authorities identified 44 more cases. A novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) was subsequently isolated 
from patients. A putative epidemiological link was made with exposures in a seafood market in 
Wuhan City.1 By the end of January 2020, 9,720 cases of 2019-nCoV were confirmed throughout 
China, with a further 15,238 suspected cases, and 213 deaths.2 More worryingly, 106 cases were also 
confirmed abroad in 19 countries, from neighbouring Japan and Vietnam, to more distant countries 
such as Finland, Canada and Australia. On 30 January 2020, the Emergency Committee of the WHO, 
under the 2005 International Health Regulations, declared 2019-nCoV acute respiratory disease a 
public health emergency of international concern. 
At this stage, the global spread of 2019-nCoV acute respiratory disease continues to grow and the 
full extent and severity of this outbreak remains to be seen. That said, global disease control of 
2019-nCoV is likely to be challenging. Experience from the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) and 2015 Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) outbreaks, both also caused by emerging 
novel coronaviruses, may be informative. Firstly, the rapid spread of 2019-nCoV is likely to be driven 
by the phenomenon ŽĨ ?ƐƵƉĞƌƐƉƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ? ?Superspreading describes heightened transmission of the 
disease to at least eight contacts and has been observed for several infectious diseases including 
SARS, MERS and influenza.3,4 Any delay in recognition of the disease and implementation of effective 
control measures increases the likelihood of greater spread of the pathogen. 
Another feature of 2019-nCoV common to SARS and MERS is the rapidity of global spread due to 
commercial air travel. The 1918 Spanish Influenza pandemic took months to spread from Europe to 
Australia or South America as ship-borne travel took time. Modern air travel allows passengers to 
traverse the globe in less than a day. This allows the viruses to rapidly spread across continents, and 
efforts at airport screening to halt them have been fairly ineffective and costly.5,6 This is in addition 
to the potential for in-flight transmission of the virus amongst passengers that was observed with 
SARS.7   
Once the pathogen has landed in a new country, the likelihood of contagion and spread is 
dependent on local transmission pathways and the strength of local health protection systems. 
Experience from MERS suggests the transmissibility of the virus is not just due to its inherent 
infectivity but it is also influenced by local contextual variables such as hygiene practices, crowding, 
and infection control standards.8 High-income countries such as the United States and United 
Kingdom have well developed health protection systems to detect and respond to communicable 
disease threats. They have the ability to robustly trace contacts, assess suspected cases and have 
them tested rapidly to get timely laboratory-confirmation of infectious status to guide the 
management of these individuals. Infected individuals identified can then be isolated until the risk of 
disease transmission has abated. This containment strategy however is resource intensive and may 
be more difficult to enforce in liberal democracies. 
The other component of well-developed health protection systems are strong infectious disease 
surveillance systems. Surveillance enables the disease to be detected, outbreaks to be tracked, and 
the efficacy of interventions to be monitored. It also can provide vital information on the 
characteristics of the pathogen and help identify vulnerable population groups. During an outbreak 
of this significance, active surveillance is likely to be instituted, often with daily monitoring of disease 
trends demanded by health authorities. Once again, this is laborious and resource intensive. 
 The current concerns then regarding the 2019-nCoV outbreak must be for low- and middle-income 
countries where health protection systems tend to be weaker. In these settings, laboratory 
resources may be lacking, notification of infectious diseases are often not timely or complete, and 
their public health infrastructure is often weak.9 Their surveillance systems may be more 
rudimentary, lacking in coverage and analytical strength.10,11 Surveillance systems are the eyes of the 
health system - without them the health system would be blind. zŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚƚĂĐŬůĞǁŚĂƚǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚƐĞĞ ?  
Unfortunately, in resource constrained settings, investment in this critical health protection 
infrastructure is a low priority compared to other health priorities. Health protection investment is 
analogous to an insurance policy - in good times when it is infrequently called upon it may be 
deemed unnecessary by policymakers. But this is a dangerous misperception. Furthermore, 
compared to other public health interventions, health protection interventions are highly cost-
effective.12 Disinvestment in health protection is risky as it is not easy to build up health protection 
infrastructure, skills and workforce rapidly. Consequently, the risk of 2019-nCoV is most likely to be 
greatest in developing countries who are most likely to lack the means and health protection 
systems to protect itself. The burden of infection may therefore be heaviest in these countries.  
Undoubtedly, most developed countries would be focused on preparing their health systems to 
protect their own health security. However, without adequate intervention in the developing 
countries, 2019-nCoV could take root and become endemic in these countries, in effect becoming 
human population reservoirs for the virus that can and will re-infect other populations worldwide. 
There is therefore both a self-preservation and a moral imperative for richer countries to offer and 
provide assistance to developing countries to help them bolster their defences against this global 
threat. What is clear is that global health threats such as 2019-nCoV will require collaborative 
solutions by the international community. 
The global 2019-nCoV outbreak story could have several different endings. With a degree of luck, 
the best-case scenario may be 2019-nCoV spontaneously petering out as was the case with SARS in 
2003. Or it may continue to sporadically pop up over many years with the occasional outbreak as 
MERS has done. Or, more worryingly, it may follow a more sinister path such as the 1918 Spanish 
influenza and take root in populations worldwide, exacting a heavy toll in morbidity and mortality 
over decades to come. The initial signs are worrying  ? early estimates put its reproductive number at 
3.11 with a case fatality rate around 3%,13,14 not too dissimilar to the 1918 pandemic flu strain.15 
Only time will tell.  
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